Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1
Lobbying is big business! For example, in the United States 13,694 registered lobbyists spent $3.49 billion on influencing congressmen and federal agencies in 2009, and this amount has been rising steadily over the past decadefor comparison, 10,405 registered lobbyists spent $1.44 billion in 1998. 1 Moreover, lobbying expenditures dwarf campaign contributions and other political donations (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000) . 2 The vast and growing business of buying political influence, the details of which are often invisible to outsiders, can affect economic welfare and redistribution in an order of magnitude that in all likelihood exceed the lobbying costs (Stigler 1971) . It is commonly perceived that lobbying is a financial investment in the political marketplace (according to Stigler 1971, there is a "demand" for regulation by corporate firms and a "supply" by policymakers). In other words, corporate firms that lobby must be doing so because they anticipate it will deliver enough benefits to recoup its costs. 3 Examples of lobbying costs include, but are not limited to, costs of monitoring and meeting with policymakers, providing testimony for congressional hearings, research, and technical information (Schlozman and Tierney 1983; Heinz et al. 1993; Nownes and Freeman 1998) , bribes (Dal Bó 2007) , and payments to registered expert lobbyists. In return for their investments, lobbying firms receive benefits such as subsidies and tax breaks.
In this paper, we use game theory and laboratory experimentation to study lobbying as a tacit collusion and bargaining process that delivers profits to the involved triad-a corporate firm and two competing political candidates-at the expense of a majority of voters. If the lobbyist and candidates seek to collude, they must overcome various 1 The Center for Responsive Politics: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ (September 1, 2010). 2 Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) find that the politically influential industries of tobacco, pharmaceuticals, telephone utilities, defense aerospace, and computers allocated between 92% and 95% of their total political expenditures to lobbying in 1997 . Similarly, Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009 report that lobbying accounted for nearly 85% of total registered political expenditures in the period 1998 to 2005. 3 The investment perspective of lobbying originates from Ben-Zion and Eytan (1974) , Stigler (1971 ), Tullock (1972 , and Welch (1974) , who coined the terminology of "quid pro quo" political contributions. For a survey on rational-choice models of interest groups including rent-seeking models see Mitchell and Munger (1991) .
2 challenges due to the complexity and uncertainties involved in reaching lobbying agreements. For one thing, complexity arises because there are many decision makers involved (e.g., lobbyists, candidates, and voters), and all of them pursue a variety of common or opposing interests (e.g., tax favors for lobbyists may hurt the general electorate). For another, complexity arises because lobbying agreements are not contract-enforceable, i.e., neither the lobbyist nor the candidates can be held accountable by law if they renege on promises given upon receiving favors. Rather, lobbying agreements are usually implicit and require mutual trust and reciprocation.
We present and analyze a game that captures some of the important strategic incentives in the lobbying process (henceforth the lobbying game). It includes one lobbyist, two competing candidates, and a set of voters. In the first stage, the lobbyist decides on whether and how much money to transfer to each candidate. In the second stage, the two candidates choose tax policies under the shadow of an upcoming simple-majority election (third stage). Candidates have a pecuniary interest in winning the election, and the tax policy of the winner determines the amount of money that is redistributed from the lobbyist to the majority of voters (i.e., the lobbyist's most favorable outcome is zero redistribution while the majority's is full redistribution). 4 Note that candidates are not contractually obligated to change their tax policy because of the lobbyist's transfers. We are interested in explaining the emergence and stability of tacit lobbying agreements, defined as mutually profitable exchanges of transfers and tax favors where those involved cannot write enforceable contracts and can communicate only through observed decisions.
To reach a tacit lobbying agreement, the lobbyist must trust her money to the two candidates, which is risky as there is no guarantee they are willing or able to return the favor. For example, having just one civic-minded candidate who cannot be coaxed to lower her tax policy ruins the lobbying investment. Moreover, even if willing, candidates might be 4 We consider the effects of lobbying on redistribution since it is sufficient to create a tension between the lobbyist and the majority. An alternative model would have been to consider the effects of lobbying on economic growth. Also, we use only one lobbyist since firms often lobby individually for "private goods" rather than jointly as industries for "public goods" (Hansen, Mitchell, and Drope 2005) . 3 unable to coordinate on low-tax policies. Any lack of coordination in tax policies will hurt the candidate with the lower tax (since a majority prefers the higher tax), which makes reciprocation of lobbying transfers risky. On the other hand, if they manage to coordinate on low-tax policies, the lobbyist and candidates can continue to benefit as long as the former keeps making transfers and the latter keep taxes low (Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974) . In this respect, the lobbyist's decision of how much to transfer to each candidate is crucial for successful policy coordination (Bental and Ben-Zion 1975) . 5 Overall, we think that the challenges of mutual trust and reciprocation in our setup are representative of important incentives faced by lobbyists and candidates in everyday politics.
We show that with only self-interested players and finitely many encounters (and other commonly-used assumptions), the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the lobbying game involves zero transfers and full redistribution. However, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that self-interest alone fails to predict behavior in games with incentives to cooperate and free-ride on the cooperation of others (see Fehr and Gächter 2000) . One type of player is particularly important to increase joint profits: the conditional cooperator, who is willing to cooperate only if others do so too (e.g., Axelrod 1981; Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001) . Using the reasoning of Kreps et al. (1982) , we argue that if players can be either self-interested or conditionally cooperative and there is incomplete information regarding the other players' types, in a sequential equilibrium, tacit lobbying agreements can emerge in a finitely-repeated lobbying game as long as lobbyists and candidates have high-enough beliefs that their respective co-colluders are conditionally cooperative. In fact, there are many possible tacit lobbying agreements with varying levels of joint profits and ways to share these profits. However, it is doubtful that each equilibrium receives (equal) support from the potential colluders. Therefore, we refine our predictions 5 Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) show empirically that resourceful lobbyists lobby both allied and opponent congressmen (as well as undecided legislators). In contrast, our lobbyist does not have a priori preferences for either of the two candidates. In this sense, their finding provides strong empirical support for a lobbyist's incentives to simultaneously woo competing policymakers. 4 by using a prominent equity norm that is suitable to our game and has empirical support in bargaining situations: i.e., split-the-difference (see Selten 1987) .
Whether or not repeated interaction is necessary for tacit lobbying agreements to emerge is an important question (e.g., Snyder 1992; Snyder and Ting 2008) . 6 To tackle this question, we compare situations where decision makers meet once and repeatedly for a finite number of periods. With one-shot encounters, tacit lobbying agreements can emerge in the lobbying game if both candidates are conditional cooperators and the lobbyist and candidates believe so with sufficiently-high probability. With repeated encounters, there is potential for the emergence of more lobbying agreements because reciprocation is also available to the lobbyist (i.e., she can use transfers in subsequent periods to "reward" or "punish" tax policies), which gives self-interested candidates an incentive to collude for at least some periods.
The profitability of lobbying has been examined by only a few observational studies.
De Figueiredo and Silverman sum up: "Despite 65 years of theoretical and empirical investigation, and a steadily increasing interest by the press and electorate, there are no large-scale statistical studies of the returns to lobbying" (2006, 598) . The main reason for this gap in the literature is the challenge associated with defining and measuring the costs and benefits of lobbying (e.g., even experts tend to disagree on the exact value of information, subsidies, tax breaks, and other units of political favors). In addition, appropriate data are scarcely available due to the lobbying coalition's incentives to avoid public scrutiny. However, there are some exceptions. For example, De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) find that a 10% increase in lobbying by a university represented in a House or Senate Appropriations Committee increases the university's earmarks by 3.5%. In another example, Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009) use data available from the Center for Responsive Politics and report that for an average corporate firm spending 1% 6 In the words of Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose: "In the absence of such [enforceable] contracts, it is difficult to understand how a 'spot market' for political favors can exist. In a simple one-period model (absent of perfectly simultaneous exchange) either contributors or legislators will surely renege on the deal, so no deals are ever made" (2000, 80) . 5 more on registered lobbying decreases the firm's effective tax rate between 0.5 and 1.6 percentage-points (in absolute amounts, each $1 invested yields returns from $6 to $20).
However, in spite of these gains only about 10% of firms choose to lobby. Our paper is an important complement to these observational studies. In our game and laboratory experiment we control the costs and benefits from lobbying, which allows us to unequivocally measure profitability. Compared to both studies, our setup is more suitable to analyze the conditions under which lobbying agreements emerge. In the conclusions we discuss similarities between their and our results with an eye on external validity.
There are many theoretical studies that have looked at lobbying from a variety of angles. Here, we discuss the ones most closely related to our paper. 7 To begin, Bental and Ben-Zion (1975) use a spatial competition model to analyze the optimal transfer decisions of a lobbyist, who can give money to two candidates (whose behavior is determined by a function) to pull their policy platforms closer to their own ideal point. In an optimum, the two symmetric or asymmetric transfers must yield equal marginal returns and depend on the distribution of the voters' and candidates' ideal points. Among other variations, the following studies use different numbers of lobbyists and policymakers. In the "protection for sale" or menu auction model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) , one incumbent is lobbied by multiple industries to influence trade policy. In Hillman and Ursprung (1988) and Magee, Brock, and Young (1989) multiple lobbyists can transfer money to competing candidates with imperfectly known policy preferences, where transfer decisions optimize the chances of winning of their favorite candidates. In contrast to these models (and the two observational studies discussed earlier), we more explicitly examine the interaction between lobbying and policymaking. This introduces collusion, bargaining, and free-rider incentives to the lobbying process that are not fully accounted for in the other studies.
Lobbying game and equilibrium predictions
In this section, we present our games and derive theoretical predictions. The lobbying game models the opportunity of a lobbyist to influence redistributive policies in her favor and in detriment of a majority of voters by transferring money to political candidates who compete in elections. Furthermore, this game is compared to a simpler model without lobbying opportunities: the redistribution game. 
The lobbying game

Equilibrium predictions
In this subsection, we derive equilibrium predictions for the lobbying and redistribution games. We distinguish between situations where lobbying is prohibited or does not emerge (Prediction 1) from those where it can emerge (Predictions 2 to 4). To do so, we vary the number of interactions (one-shot vs. finitely-repeated) and the information players possess about own and others' preferences (complete vs. incomplete). Finally, we refine the predicted set of all possible tacit lobbying agreements using split-the-difference, a prominent profit-sharing norm.
First, we examine societies, assuming that everyone is self-interested regarding their own payoffs and this is common knowledge (as are all procedures and parameters of the game, including the number of interactions). 9 Moreover, we use subgame perfection and refine our predictions by focusing on weakly undominated strategies in each stage of the 9 For our experimental parameters, the predictions do not differ markedly when replacing universal self-interest with the assumption that some or all voters/candidates have social preferences with reference to the entire society (e.g., Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) . This is because with tax policies close to 100%, payoffs are similar across all members of the society and lower tax policies generally increase inequality.
Calculations are available upon request.
9 game and by assuming that voters who are indifferent (i.e., face identical tax policies ) vote randomly with equal probability for each candidate. Under these assumptions, subgame perfect equilibrium yields the following prediction for the lobbying and redistribution games: 
̅ . Agreements are tacit, as we allow players to communicate only through observed decisions.
A tacit lobbying coalition has the power to undermine the majority's will (assuming that it is full redistribution; cf. footnote 9), but whether or not this happens strongly depends on mutual trust and reciprocation among the rich voter and candidates. To be precise, the rich voter must trust her money to the two candidates, who must return the favor by coordinating on a winning tax policy that is sufficiently low to make the lobbying investment profitable.
To understand the emergence of tacit lobbying agreements, we examine societies where, with strictly positive probability, self-interested players coexist alongside a second type of player: conditional cooperators, who are willing to cooperate to attain higher joint 10 profits as long as others do so too (Axelrod 1981; Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001) . 10 Additionally, we assume that players know their own type, but they have incomplete information about the types of all other players and this is common knowledge (all other assumptions remain the same as before). 11 In the analysis that follows, we are particularly interested in the possibility of collusion among the rich voter and two candidates against the majority's will of full redistribution. 
Argument:
We provide intuition rather than formally deriving the sequential equilibria underlying this prediction, which is tedious but straightforward. Our definition of a tacit lobbying agreement implies a winning tax policy strictly smaller than 1. A self-interested candidate always chooses according to the will of the majority, 1, since in a one-shot game she cannot be rewarded by the rich voter with future transfers. Thus, for a tacit lobbying agreement to emerge it is necessary that both candidates are conditional cooperators. Moreover, to earn strictly more than ̅ , the rich voter's expected tax favor must exceed her total transfers, 1 ̅ , irrespective of her type. Finally, in expectation a candidate must earn strictly more than . In other words, if she chooses a tax policy strictly smaller than 1 during the policymaking process, she must expect total costs of policy changes that are strictly smaller than her received transfers.
We continue by examining the emergence of tacit agreements in the finitely-repeated lobbying game. To do so, we use the reasoning of Kreps et al. (1982) , who analyze a finitelyrepeated prisoners' dilemma where players can be either self-interested or conditionallycooperative and there is incomplete information regarding the other player's type. They show that, even if the probability of meeting a conditional cooperator is small, sequential equilibria exist where both players cooperate for some repetitions of the game (but there is also always a sequential equilibrium with mutual defection in every period). Although cooperation in the lobbying game is more complex than in the prisoners' dilemma, their reasoning also applies in our context. Importantly, in the finitely-repeated lobbying game the set of feasible sequential equilibria involving tacit lobbying agreements is markedly larger than in the one-shot version of the game. This is because, depending on their expected continuation profits for remaining in the coalition, self-interested candidates now have an incentive to mimic conditional cooperators for some periods of the game (cf.
Prediction 2 where agreements cannot arise if there is at least one self-interested candidate). For the simple reason that more candidates have an incentive to cooperatewhich also increases everyone's belief of collusion being successfulwe expect more tacit lobbying agreements to emerge in repeated than in one-shot encounters. Our arguments based on sequential equilibrium are summarized as follows: Argument: This prediction follows from the discussion above.
Predictions 2 and 3 describe a large set of tacit lobbying agreements. However, it is doubtful that all agreements receive (equal) support from potential colluders. In order to refine our predictions and select agreements that are more plausible than others, we turn to profit-sharing norms derived from the equity principle (Adams 1965; Selten 1978) . 12 Such "equity norms" can serve as focal points for how to divide joint profits (Schelling 1960 ) and have lots of empirical support (see Konow 2003) . Since corporate firms usually have much larger incomes than political candidates-meaning that dividing the surplus from collusion is more realistic than dividing the coalition's total payoff-and candidates are symmetric in our setup, a suitable equity norm to analyze tacit lobbying agreements is split-the-difference.
This norm has been found to be very important for individuals in bargaining situations (see Konow 2003) . In our context, split-the-difference proposes that the joint profits from a tacit lobbying agreement (i.e., the amount not redistributed to the majority, 1 ̅ )
are to be divided equally among the three colluders. 13 Following the arguments given above, we predict that the tacit lobbying agreements that do materialize are likely to be consistent with the split-the-difference norm. However, there is an important caveat due to the sequencing of transfer and tax policy decisions, which puts the rich voter in the weaker "trustor" position compared to the candidates' stronger "trustee" position. 
Procedures and experimental design
The periods and parameters as previously described (subjects had all this information).
Moreover, at the beginning of the respective stage, everyone in the society was informed of: the amount the rich voter transferred to each candidate, the pair of tax policies accepted by the candidates (although, only candidates observe the entire policymaking process), and the number of votes obtained by each candidate in the election.
In Strangers, at the beginning of a session four subjects were randomly assigned to be voters and all others were put into a candidate pool of four to eight (the number of candidates depended on the number of subjects that showed up). The assignment of voters and candidates never changed during the entire session. At the beginning of each period, the voters were randomly divided into one rich voter and three poor voters. Similarly, the candidates were randomly divided into two active candidates, labeled A or B, and two to six inactive candidates. Only the active candidates in a period could make decisions; their inactive counterparts received 25 points and could watch the game on their screens. Since 14 the constant reassignment of roles among voters and roles and labels among candidates made it practically impossible for an individual to build up reputation, our Strangers treatments resemble 15 successive one-shot games.
In Partners, at the beginning of a session subjects were randomly assigned to statistically independent societies of six subjects. Thereafter, each society was randomly divided into one rich voter, three poor voters, and two candidates A or B (there were no inactive candidates). Unlike in Strangers, the voters' roles and the candidates' labels never changed during the entire session. Therefore, our Partners treatments represent finitelyrepeated games.
We varied Lobbying and No Lobbying within subjects and Strangers and Partners between subjects. Specifically, each session contained two parts (i.e., treatments) of 15 periods. Subjects knew there would be two parts, but they received the instructions of the second part only after the first part was completed. To account for order effects, some sessions began with Lobbying and continued with No Lobbying and vice versa in the other sessions. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design and specifies the number of societies (i.e., independent observations) and subjects in each treatment and sequence. 
Experimental results
In this section, we present our experimental results. First, we describe the election
outcomes. Thereafter, we analyze the observed tax policies and their relationship with transfers. Lastly, we discuss the payoff consequences of lobbying. Table 2 contains summary statistics for the main variables in the experiment (standard deviations are given in parenthesis). For each treatment, it displays the means for: tax policies, the proportion of tax policies equal to 1, winning tax policies, the proportion of winning tax policies equal to 1, transfers, the proportion of transfers equal to 0, and the proportion of election outcomes that are 'unexpected' (i.e., where the candidate with a lower tax wins, which cannot be explained by everyone voting sincerely according to own pecuniary interests).
Elections
As seen in the last column of Table 2 , only between 0.6% and 3.0% of all elections result in an unexpected outcome. In part, this is due to a majority of elections pitting two candidates with identical tax policies, as observed in 78.2% (75.2%; 83.5%; 63.5%) of all elections in
Strangers-No Lobbying (Strangers-Lobbying; Partners-No Lobbying; Partners-Lobbying).
However, in elections with different tax policies the higher-tax candidate does indeed 
Winning tax policies
For convenience, since unexpected election outcomes are so rare and our focus is on tacit lobbying agreements, we henceforth treat these elections "as if" they are consistent with the majority's pecuniary interest. Figure 1 shows for the various treatments the mean tax policy and the mean proportion of tax policies equal to 1. It portrays the means for each treatment as bars and for each society as circles. Moreover, we distinguished between statistics for both candidates' tax policies (upper panels) and for winning tax policies only (lower panels). The same pattern is observed for the mean proportion of (winning) tax policies equal to 1, but understandably, these means are slightly lower (see Table 2 ).
Tax policies
To test whether tax policies are significantly different across treatments, we estimate a Tobit regression with the tax policy as the dependent variable (censored at 1) and treatment dummies as independent variables. We use a nested model with subject and society random effects, and robust standard errors clustered at the society level. 15 This method allows us to fully utilize the panel structure of our data and take into account that the distribution of tax policies is censored. 
Tacit lobbying agreements and mutual reciprocation
In this subsection, we examine in more detail the conditions under which lobbying can stimulate low tax policies. From here, the rich voter's payoff strictly decreases as transfers increase or as the winning tax policy increases. The candidates' average payoff strictly increases with transfers and does not directly depend on the tax policy. Finally, the poor voters' average payoff strictly increases with the winning tax policy and does not directly depend on transfers. In addition, Figure 2 shows the break-even line (black line), which contains all pairs of mean transfers and winning tax policies where the rich voter earns 40 points, i.e., her total transfers equal the benefits from lower tax policies. Therefore, since the rich voter earns less than 40 points in the white area above the break-even line and more than 40 points in the gray area below it, the gray-shaded area corresponds to the set of symmetric tacit lobbying agreements (i.e., with equal transfers per candidate and equal tax policies). 18 The split-the-difference line (gray line) contains all pairs of symmetric transfers and tax policies where the rich voter and each candidate receive an equal share of the points not redistributed to the poor voters.
Lastly, the figure also shows best-fit lines that plot the estimated relationship between mean transfers and tax policies using a Tobit regression (censored at 1 and with robust standard errors).
In Strangers, all the eleven societies have a mean winning tax policy close to 100%
(with perhaps one exception at 89.7%). The mean transfers per candidate, on the other hand, differ across societies: five societies have low levels (less than 5 points), four have moderate levels (around 10 points), and two have very high levels (around 20 points). What is clearly seen in Figure 2 is that there is no relationship between mean transfers and mean 18 There are also tacit lobbying agreements with asymmetric transfers and tax policies. These include special cases of split-the-difference where one candidate chooses a lower tax policy than the other and loses the election but is compensated for doing so with a larger transfer from the rich voter.
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(winning) tax policies in this treatment. Tobit regressions (the best fit lines) using mean transfers to predict tax policies and winning tax policies yield statistically insignificant coefficients of -0.010 (p = 0.961) and -0.136 (p = 0.453).
In Partners we can distinguish two sets of societies: high-tax and low-tax societies.
There are ten high-tax societies where, apparently, little effort was made towards reaching tacit lobbying agreements. Namely, on average, they have low transfers per candidate (less than 5 points) and high winning tax policies (between 90% and 100%). On the other hand, 
Tacit lobbying agreements
Tacit lobbying agreements Tacit of Prediction 2). However, since there are some unsuccessful lobbying attempts, the second part of Prediction 2 appears to be more reasonable than Prediction 1 (i.e., subjects believe conditional cooperators exist but are not enough to support cooperation in a one-shot lobbying game). Finally, Prediction 3 is supported in Partners-Lobbying: tacit lobbying agreements emerge, and they do so more often than in Strangers-Lobbying (41.2% vs. 0%). 19 In Figure 2 , three low-tax societies in Partners-Lobbying lie just below the break-even line. According to our definition of tacit lobbying agreements, all colluders must be strictly better off than in Prediction 1. While this does not hold on average in these societies, it does for most periods and it only breaks down in later periods due to endgame effects (see Prediction 3). For ease of illustration, we do not distinguish between low-tax societies and treat them all as societies where tacit lobbying agreements arise (in most of the periods).
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Are tacit lobbying agreements the result of mutual reciprocation between the rich voter and the two candidates? To answer this question, we use regression analysis to test whether changes in transfers can predict subsequent changes in tax policies and vice versa.
Here, we only analyze the Partners-Lobbying treatment since it is where a positive correlation between transfers and tax policies exists (results for Strangers-Lobbying are available in our online appendix). We first investigate the effects of changes in transfers on tax policies before we examine the reverse effects. Table 3 These two variables capture the candidates' reaction to the actions of the other candidate across periods. Finally, we use as an independent variable to measure a potential time trend. The regressions are run with subject fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics and with robust standard errors clustered at the society level.
The first regression in Table 3 is run with all societies in Partners-Lobbying. As we can To examine whether these findings are crucial determinants for tacit lobbying agreements to arise, we ran the same OLS regressions separating the ten high-tax societies (third column in Table 3 ) from the seven low-tax societies (fourth column). In both cases, we observe the same pattern of candidate reciprocity: a significant negative relationship between changes in transfers and tax policies (p ≤ 0.007) and a significant decline over time of the candidates' propensity to reciprocate (p ≤ 0.029). As one might suspect, reciprocation is stronger in low-tax than in high-tax societies, but the difference between the coefficients Next, we look at the other side of the coin of mutual reciprocation. Do rich voters reward lower tax policies with higher transfers and punish higher tax policies with lower transfers? Behaviorally, reciprocation is slightly more complicated for rich voters than for candidates because, as first movers, they cannot reciprocate within the same period. This implies that they must evaluate the actions of candidates in the previous period taking into account that candidates were reacting to their own previous action. Table 4 presents the results of OLS using as the dependent variable the change in the rich voters' total transfers from period 1 to period : , , . For our independent variables, we distinguish between two situations: periods following an increase in total transfers and periods following no such increase. This distinction proxies the rich voter's normative expectations of the candidates' behavior. Specifically, we assume that rich voters think candidates should lower their taxes after an increase in transfers but have no such presumption otherwise.
Our first two independent variables measure changes in the winning tax policy after a previous increase in the rich voter's total transfers:
We distinguish between OLS regressions for the eleven high-tax societies and seven low-tax societies next (see last two columns in 
Conclusions
We experimentally study whether tacit lobbying agreements emerge in a strategic situation where a lobbyist can send money to two competing political candidates in order to influence redistributive tax policies. Importantly, candidates are not obliged to respond to lobbying and must consider their probability of winning upcoming simple-majority elections in which the lobbyist prefers zero redistribution and a majority prefers full redistribution. We compare situations with and without lobbying opportunities and situations with one-shot and finitely-repeated interaction.
We observe that tacit lobbying agreements arise in about 40% of societies with repeated interaction but never with one-shot interaction (in the latter treatment, despite some lobbying attempts, the experimental results are very similar to our treatments without the option to lobby). Thus, a substantial number of subjects make use of the opportunity to form tacit lobbying agreements at the expense of a majority. It is likely that more subjects are willing to collude, but they are unable to overcome the many obstacles of the coalition-formation process. We find that mutual reciprocation between the lobbyist and the two candidates is the driving force behind the emergence and stability of tacit lobbying agreements (candidates reward increased transfers with lower taxes and the lobbyist rewards lower taxes with higher transfers). However, the success of lobbying not only requires reciprocity between the lobbyist and candidates but also between the two candidates (i.e., lowering their tax policy if the other candidate's tax policy is smaller than their own). Supporting our theoretical predictions, the experimental results indicate two main reasons why repeated interaction is necessary for tacit lobbying agreements to arise.
First, unlike in one-shot encounters, with repeated encounters the lobbyist can reciprocate the tax policies of the candidates. Second, the opportunity to reciprocate across periods gives self-interested candidates an incentive to mimic conditional cooperators in anticipation of future profits.
Interestingly, in support of the external validity of our experimental results, we observe some similarities in the findings between the observational study of Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009) analysis mainly on the profitability of lobbying. In addition to profitability, our lobbying game and experiment allows us to examine the decision-making process underlying the formation of tacit lobbying agreements. We provide three reasons why in the field and laboratory many firms do not lobby. First, some firms and candidates are civic-minded, and hence, they have no intention to challenge the will of the majority. Second, even when willing to join a coalition, it is very difficult for potential colluders to overcome the substantial obstacles of reaching tacit lobbying agreements, which are not contractenforceable. Importantly, if firms and candidates expect to interact only for a short period of time, they have disincentives to collude. Third, they need to settle on one of the many possible tacit lobbying agreements, which determines how the joint profits are shared.
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The use of game theory and experiments to study lobbying can be extended to answer many questions that are not easily addressed with other methods. For example, one can design experiments to assess the effect of counteractive lobbying by the majority (see Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Großer and Reuben 2010) or to study the impact of explicit communication between lobbyists and candidates. Future research could also investigate the effect of public information about lobbying transfers, i.e., one could focus on studying under-the-counter deals, which tend to be unobservable in the field. Finally, an interesting next step would be to study the effects of asymmetry (e.g., candidates with different policymaking capacities) on the ability of potential colluders to reach an agreement. Given the many possible extensions, this paper is a first step in a line of research that has the potential to give us fundamental insights on lobbying, the financially-dominant form of political contribution, and the complex process of buying political influence that shapes everyday policymaking.
